POLITICAL STRONGMEN AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY

 

 

We are living in times where political strongmen are emerging globally. Think of Donald Trump in the West and Rodrigo Duterte in the East. For a strongman’s promises of national pride and a better life, the people are willing to compromise democracy and human rights. What does this mean for women as well as other marginalized groups?

 

The Political Strongman

Political strongman is a topic that had gained media attention in recent years, particularly with the publication of Gideon Rachman’s book, The Age of the Strongman, in 2018. Not surprisingly, the democratic decline and rising authoritarianism of the last 30 years (Freedom House, 2021 in Morgan 2021) has been marked by the rise of political strongmen.

Political strongmen typically garner their followers through the notions of national identity and their campaign to improve economic conditions. It is common for strongmen to gain support using personal appeal rather than by offering a feasible program. Strongmen tend to have a populist appeal and position themselves as protectors of groups with a certain faith, ethnicity, or class.

In many countries, the lower-middle class has grown dissatisfied with the economic marginalization they continue to suffer, viewing that democratic leaders have shown lack of competence to address these issues. Ethnic, religious, and class divides are the cause of this discontent, so strongman leaders try to gain support by using identity politics and the claim that they can close the gap in inequalities, particularly in favor of a specific group. 

Aside from former heads of state such as Trump, Duterte, and Jair Bolsonaro, current leaders who are labeled as political strongmen include Viktor Orbán, Benjamin Netanyahu, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Vladmir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Narendra Modi, not to mention the dozen heads of state with over ten years of leadership in Africa. Adding to the list of strongmen political leaders is Indonesia’s prospective new president, Prabowo Subianto.

 

A mural of Netanyahu and Trump (globalnews.ca).

 

Some of these leaders, such as Erdoğan, Putin, and Jinping embrace a nationalism that is hostile to Western democracy and liberalism, but all political strongmen commonly erode democracy by cooptation of institutions, some form of media control, and continued suppression of marginalized groups and oppositions. 

In an authoritarian setting, modern political strongmen use strategies similar to previous fascist strongmen of the Second World War era. For instance, media censorship, state control of the media, and media propaganda are among the common practices.

In a democracy, strongmen may portray themselves as democratic leaders while compromising democratic values and rule of law, and exercising suppression. Laws and violence are further utilized to crush political opponents or sideline oppositions and prevent new leadership. They frequently use media tactics to consolidate political power to manipulate public opinion by shaping certain narratives, and omitting others, to fit the governments’ purpose.

"Laws and violence are further utilized to crush political opponents or sideline oppositions and prevent new leadership. 

Therefore, strongmen leadership—in a more or lesser degree—is characterized by disinformation and the undermining or limited freedom of the press. Moreover, many strongman leaders have exercised the monitoring of citizens’ movement, flawed democratic elections, and suppression of women’s rights and marginalization of ethnic/religious and sexual minorities.

 

What Does It Mean for Women?

Nationalists and conservative cultural values that strongmen identify with are typically anti-LGBTQ and lack support for gender equality. The personality embodied by the strongman cult often presents them as the father of the nation, justifying masculine traits as successful leadership. This perspective is translated into government policies and rhetoric that marginalize women and ethnic/religious and sexual minority groups.

This is why women have been the target of strongmen policy changes. Women have also been the target of sexist statements by strongman leaders, from women’s roles in the family and nation to explicit degradation of women’s body, while women activists have been the target of arrests.

Strongmen leaders commonly opt for the strengthening of women’s traditional role. For example, Bolsonaro abolished Brazil's human rights ministry and replaced it with a new ministry for women, family, human rights, and indigenous affairs when he took office, a ministry which views that women are born to be mothers and does not see the need for reducing gender inequality.

 

Jokowi and Putin share a joke (keuangannews.id).

 

 

Strongmen also tend to provide lack of support for laws that protect women. Putin—often seen as the first of the modern strongmen—has decriminalized forms of domestic violence that caused “minor harms”, while Modi’s Hindu nationalist government opposes the criminalization of spousal rape. The Trump administration had revoked protection against sexual harassment in the workplace.

Women’s activism is seen as defiance. Women human rights defenders have been the target of arrests and criminalization. Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party authorities have arrested women human rights defenders and shut down independent women’s organizations. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, many prominent women human rights defenders, were at risk of attack and extrajudicial killing. Duterte was also quoted to have said that the government will shoot the vagina of female guerrillas, stating that women would be “useless” without their vaginas.

Strongmen policies have curtailed women’s reproductive rights. The Trump administration had cut international funding for UNFA which provides family planning and reproductive service to hundreds of countries around the world. The goal of maintaining ethnic purity has also breached women’s reproductive rights as immigrant women are expected to have less children. Such as the case in Hungary where Orbán urges native-born women to have more children, exempting income tax for women who have four or more children and declaring, “We want Hungarian children. Migration for us is surrender.”

 

"Strongmen policies have curtailed women’s reproductive rights.

Not surprisingly, in 2019, following these policies and statements, female world leaders launched a counteract against strongman leaderships. On February 28^th, 2019, the Guardian reported that “More than 30 female world leaders have called for a fightback against the erosion of women’s rights, with one former minister singling out countries led by ‘a macho-type strongman’ as part of the problem.”

Even though leaders labeled strongmen tend to be men, strongman type of leadership is not unique to male leaders. Throughout history there have been a few female leaders labeled as strongman or strongwoman. These include long reining prime ministers such as Margaret Thatcher, Indira Gandhi, and Sheikh Hasina. The latter is the longest serving prime minister in the history of Bangladesh. Named one of the most powerful women by Forbes in 2022, her reign has been riddled with enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, as well as restriction of freedom of the media.

 

Indonesia’s New Leader

Adding to the list of strongmen political leaders emerging these past few years is Indonesia’s prospective new president, Prabowo Subianto. Subianto, a former general of Indonesia’s past authoritarian regime, has a disreputable past of human rights abuses leading to his discharge and exile in the late ‘90s, and subsequent ban in entering the US, which was lifted in 2019.

After two decades of reform in Indonesia, current president, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) who was once hailed as the spearhead of Indonesia’s democratic reform appears to have evolved into a strongman. Jokowi subsequently issued defamation laws and attempts to secure his rule by using his son (Gibran Rakabuming Raka) as an extension of his power through his son’s vice-presidential candidacy. Alongside his son, Jokowi is supporting the military strongman of the previous authoritarian regime and ex-foe, Subianto, as presidential candidate. 

 

Prabowo and Gibran's cartoon image used in their campaign (cnnidonesia.com).

 

Media spin tactics are of course used to transform Subianto’s image. Once a feared general, now he sells himself as the loveable grandpa of the young generation. While leaving behind previous support by Islamist groups, Subianto displays himself as a democratic figure, alongside using various media campaigns to attract the younger population. During the presidential election campaign, anything related to women mentioned by Subianto was mainly in the context of health, such as improving nutrition for pregnant women. This shows his lack of perspective and knowledge of strategies for long-term empowerment of women.

Scholars have said that true political reform had never took place in Indonesia, there was only a new head of state surrounded by the same circle of oligarchs which plagued the previous government. So, when Jokowi appointed the former regime’s notorious general, Subianto—who was twice his opponent in the two previous presidential elections—as minister for defense in 2019, most should have grasped the narrative behind this reconciliation.

Most might want to believe that the postreform era of Indonesia has no room for such old players with a dishonorable past. In reality, the power of coalition manifests itself in less mysterious ways, but we perceive it as something of a plot twist, while it was actually quite predictable.

 

Strongmen are Here to Stay

It appears that widespread economic insecurity and the ongoing crisis of democracy in various parts of the world will provide a landscape for strongmen leaders to maintain their hold over the people and the opportunity for new ones to emerge. The strongman cult will continue to spread. The rise of populism and decline of multiculturalism under strongman leaderships will further cause the erosion of women’s rights. 

 

Check out my other blog for essays on gender, history, and culture.

Top Image: via Pinterest 

 

Sources

Cliffe, Jeremy (2023) As strongman leaders around the world begin to fall, has authoritarianism peaked?  The New Statesman. https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2023/05/strongman-leaders-around-world-begin-fall-authoritarianism-peaked [19 February 2024].

Foa, Roberto Stefan (2021) 'Strongmen Win in Weak States.' Journal of Democracy. https://journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-strongmen-win-in-weak-states/ [19 February 2024].

Klobucista, Claire and Mariel Ferragamo (2023) 'Africa’s "Leaders for Life".' Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/africas-leaders-life [17 March 2024].

Lyons, Kate (2019) 'Rise of the 'strongman': Dozens of female world leaders warn women's rights being eroded.' The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/28/rise-of-the-strongman-dozens-of-female-world-leaders-warn-womens-rights-being-eroded [17 March 2024].

Morgan, Melissa (2021) ‘Understanding the Global Rise of Authoritarianism.’ Stanford https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism [31 December 2023]

Scribner, Colleen (2019) 'Why Strongmen Attack Women's Rights.' Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/article/why-strongmen-attack-womens-rights [17 February 2024].

Utama, Virdika Rizky (2023) 'Prabowo Subianto: Indonesia’s perennial strongman recast as the adorable grandpa.' Indonesia at Melbourne. https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/prabowo-subianto-indonesias-perennial-strongman-recast-as-the-adorable-grandpa/ [25 February 2024].

Walker, Tony (2018) 'Why the world should be worried about the rise of strongman politics.' The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/why-the-world-should-be-worried-about-the-rise-of-strongman-politics-100165 [17 February 2024].

West, John (2022) 'The Age of The Strongman: How the Cult of the Leader Threatens Democracy Around the World.' Asian Century Institute. https://asiancenturyinstitute.com/politics/1739-the-age-of-the-strongman-how-the-cult-of-the-leader-threatens-democracy-around-the-world [19 February 2024].

Zoellner, Danielle (2020) 'Five major things Trump has done to roll back women’s rights.; The Independent.co.uk. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-women-international-womens-day-abortion-policies-healthcare-a9380411.html [16 March 2024].

 

FERTILITY AND THE LABOR OF CARE

 

 

 

Policies to curb fertility rates have seen more success than those aiming to increase them. Throughout history, these successes in population control were achieved at the cost of women’s reproductive rights. In contrast, countries in various parts of the world today are experiencing a threatening decline in fertility rates, but policies to reverse it have not worked. This is because, in part, these policies have yet to touch on the underlying problems of equality. These problems need to be sufficiently addressed as many countries are facing a fertility rate far below the 2.1 average number of children born to a woman that is needed to build a stable population, which may result in irrecoverable conditions for the future generation. Furthermore, policies that potentially disregard human rights may emerge as a desperate response to the population problem.

 

High Cost, Low Fertility                          

This trend of declining birth rate is threatening some of the strongest economies, where women’s employment rates are over half of the countries’ working age population. In many of these countries, high costs of birth, childcare, and education have discouraged women and men to have children. As these costs appear to be the direct cause of low birth rates, governments tend to take a policy approach targeted at these factors. However, these initiatives have not seen much success. Fertility rates continue to plummet as women and men choose not to have children.

Take Japan, a country with one of the lowest birth rates in the world and one of the highest life expectancies, its fertility rate is 1.3. Japan has 14.4 million children under the age of 15, that’s just about 11.5% of the total population. Lack of students has led 8,580 public schools to close between 2002 and 2020. 

 

Schools in Japan lack students (Photo: Nippon.com)

 

Japan’s high cost of living, expensive housing, limited space, and lack of city-based childcare services pose many challenges to raise children. The results are delayed marriages and the decline of the marriage rate. To tackle the crisis, the Japanese government has vowed to provide benefits that could support freelance or self-employed workers in addition to extra allowances for education, housing, and child support, as well as the establishment of more daycare centers. It is doubtful, however, whether these policies will significantly increase the fertility rate when we consider South Korea—a country where childcare policies have evolved over decades, but the fertility rate is at its lowest. 

South Korea is struggling with its lowest fertility rate, with the average number of children born to a woman in her reproductive years at 0.78 as of February 2023 and is expected to drop to 0.65 in 2025. In the past 16 years, the country’s fertility rate has dropped more than 25%, even though the government claimed that it has spent over $200 billion on programs to increase births. The Seoul Metropolitan Government is providing subsidy for female residents, regardless of marital status, who would like to delay pregnancy by freezing their eggs.

South Korea is notorious for its high cost of living, education, and housing which makes it an undesirable place to raise children. In addition, long term effects of past strict population control policies, as in China, have changed attitudes towards having children in South Korea. Both countries are now left with, according to experts, irreversible low fertility rates (1.7 births per woman for China in 2023) and an ageing population. 

 

South Korea is notorious for its high cost of living (Photo: The Diplomat)

  

Similarly, Italy bears the lowest fertility rate in the EU region, which is about 1.3 in 2023, despite various government initiatives—including parental leave allowance and the launch of birth payments since 2015. Changes over the second postwar years, such as challenges to the Catholic Church, emergence of single-parent families, and decrease in the number of marriages have shift values of a traditional big family to a small one. Since the 2008 economic crisis, Italy has seen a steady decline of birth rates. As the economy weakened, the country faces increasingly high cost of living and housing and—like many other countries—childcare issues.

Likewise, experts also identify cultural factors aside from economic factors for the decline of fertility rates in South Korea. This is particularly attributed to the culture of workism, where work defines an individual’s value, which is considered more important than one’s personal life achievements. This competitive culture combined with deep-rooted patriarchal culture, which puts the burden of childcare and housework on women, impede government’s financial efforts to boost birth rates.

 

The Labor of Care

The effect of paternity leave

Instead of just targeting to ease the economic burden to have children, governments also take other measures to balance the responsibility of childcare between both parents in the home, with the hope to increase the number of working women that would start a family. For example, in 2021, the Japanese parliament passed a bill that allows Japanese men up to four weeks of flexible paternity leave.

However, entrenched patriarchal traditions will not change overnight or even within decades because of a few policies. Japanese male workers are hesitant to take paternity leave because of the damage it can do to one’s career. In 2021, only about 14% male workers are reported to take this leave. Both women and men in Japan, China, and South Korea have reported that marriage and children have had negative effects on their careers. 

 

China's previous one-child policy mural (Photo: abc.net au)

 

Interestingly, Sweden, a country long known for its family friendly policies, good quality and low-cost education is also facing low fertility rate (1.8 births per woman in 2023). Sweden is the pioneer of parental leave with state-mandatory paternity leave as early as 1974. With this policy, Sweden has transformed caring roles by replacing maternity leave with parental leave. However, since 2021, Sweden only saw an increase of around 69,230 people (0.7 percent). High inflation rate in Sweden is influencing couples’ decision to have children. Nevertheless, there are other predominant factors.

Persisting gaps in carework

Decades of government initiatives in Sweden have narrowed gender inequality in the workplace and raised gender equality in childcare in the home. Nevertheless, even in what is considered one of the world’s most egalitarian countries, women still perform a larger proportion of unpaid carework. In Sweden, 74% of women do housework or cook for at least one hour every day compared to 56% of men (Demographic Research, 2013), a figure that is still lower than the European average of 79% to 34% (Gender Equality Index website, 2019). Swedish women spend about 3.7 hours on unpaid carework (including housework) compared to 2.9 hours which men do, while the number daily is 5.1 to 2.2 hours in Italy (OECD Stats, 2023). These figures indicate that caring roles and housework duties are still gendered in both European countries.

 

Policies need to transform carework (Photo: wipsociology.org)

 

The gap is wider in the Asian countries discussed above. In Japan, a survey conducted in 2021 revealed that on average, female respondents spent more hours on childcare, with 4.7 percent reporting a daily time of 13 hours or more, while around seven percent of male respondents reported spending an average of one hour per day on childcare. Other data reveal that women in Japan spend about 2.55 hours daily on housework in 2021 compared to men who spend only 26 minutes daily (Statista, 2022). In China in 2019, the number is 3.48 hours daily compared to 1.32 hours daily (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). In South Korea in 2019, married women spend 3.75 hours daily compared to married men who spent 64 minutes daily on housework (Statista, 2023). This indicates that despite the fact that employed women constitute over half of the working age population, traditional gender roles in domestic work and childcare still persist in these Asian societies.

Meanwhile, Sweden (and other Nordic countries) may seem light years ahead of many countries in terms of reaching gender advancements that are beyond female labor force participation and which transforms male roles in the private sphere. However, Swedish women tend to be overrepresented in lower paying jobs in the public sector compared to men who are in higher-paying private sector jobs and spending less time on housework.

 

Policies Need to Transform Caring Roles

In the countries mentioned above, even though women have a high participation in the labor force, women spend more hours in unpaid carework than men. So, these countries like many other countries across the globe have successfully transformed women into workers (albeit to meet the state’s development goals) but have been less successful in or have ignored the importance of transforming men into carers and effectively challenging the traditional male breadwinner role. This gender gap, if not addressed sufficiently, will continue to impede potential increase in birth rates and gender equality. 

 

 Policies have yet to transform carework

to integrate men into this labor

 

Furthermore, economic conditions and the burden of unpaid carework impact the decision to have children, likely more for women, especially in countries where traditional gender roles are an important part of the culture. As economic conditions worsen and gender norms remain stagnant, women will continue to delay or abandon the idea of having children. This is why policies aiming to boost fertility rates are not making significant changes. Not only because insufficient economic incentives impede the success of these policies, but these policies have yet to transform carework to integrate men into this labor the way other policies have integrated women into the labor force (albeit not to say without discrimination).

 

The Option of Immigration

To yield the results of cultural transformation will take time. Therefore, simultaneously, shorter-term measures must be taken. Immigration to help recover from population decline may be the only viable option, one which some governments may have already considered. However, this does not appear to be a solution that will find much support from the people. In South Korea and Japan, in particular, multiculturalism tends to be frown upon; the people prefer a homogenous society.

Meanwhile in EU countries, problems with large influx of immigrants and the socioeconomic and political issues that arise with it, make this option one that is indeed controversial. Immigration has been met with resistance in the form of a rather extreme nationalist fear of extinction by “ethnic replacement” which justifies an anti-immigration stance to the population problem. This view is reminiscent of fascist population initiatives of the past where a woman’s body is controlled to reproduce a specific race.

 

Mussolini checking over Italian mothers' unpaid reproductive work for the state (Photo: Jstor.org)

 

Nevertheless, even the most unfavorable option should be considered in such a crisis. Especially when we understand that a lack of workers in the future will mean a generation living under a collapsed pension system as there are very few contributors and, at the same time, few people to support the elderly.

So as we can see, ending the continuous decline of a population involves not only financial incentives, but moreover, a shift in perspective from entrenched cultural traditions and homogeneity to an acceptance of a different kind of society. Furthermore, having or not having children is a human right, including the reproductive rights of women, which means government intervention on the number of children is not only undesirable, but is a potential breach of this right.

Top image: Izz R. (Unsplash) 

 

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